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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered shocking terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C. Most agree that the attacks were perpetrated by Osama bin
Laden and several of his al Qaeda followers and that these same non-state
actors had been behind previous attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. On October 7, 2001, the United States used
massive military force in self-defense against such ongoing processes of
armed attack by bin Laden and members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. At that
time, the United States also used massive military force against members of
the armed forces of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This upgraded an
ongoing belligerency between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance and
triggered application of the laws of war with respect to U.S. military responses
in the Afghan theater of war.'
By November 13, 2001, President Bush had made the erroneous claim
that the September 11 th attacks were acts of international terrorism of such an
intensity as to create "a state of armed conflict" and that they amounted to acts
of "war" by bin Laden and his followers. 2 The Bush administration also
argued that it had a right to detain any member of al Qaeda and other persons
allegedly posing threats to national security without trial as "enemy" or
"unlawful" combatants whether or not they were captured inside Afghanistan
or in connection with the October 7th war with the Taliban.3 Quite
inconsistently, the White House also claimed that the war with the Taliban
regime did not trigger application of laws of war contained in the 1949
Geneva Conventions. This error was finally admitted on February 8, 2002,
when the White House agreed that the law of armed conflict applied to the
war with the Taliban, but the administration shifted its argument to one
seeking a sweeping denial of prisoner of war status for every member of the
t Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston.
1. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1, 5-7, 6 n.15 (2001) [hereinafter Paust, Antiterrorism No.1]; Jordan J. Paust, There is
No Need To Revise the Laws of War in Light of September lth, at
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/paust.pdf. Portions of the latter essay have been borrowed for use in this
essay.
2. See, e.g., Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 1(a) (Nov. 16, 2001).
3. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2002); U.S. Dep't of
Defense, "DOD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers," Jan. 11, 2002,
http//www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2OO2/tOI112002_tOll lsd.html; Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, A Year of Loss-Reexamining Civil Liberties since September 11 25-28, 35 (2002),
http://www.Ichr.org/US_law/loss/loss report.pdf.
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armed forces of the Taliban.4 Such schizophrenic claims are not merely
illogical and devoid of legal merit, but can also have dangerous consequences
with respect to permissible forms of non-state actor violence, application of
the laws of war in actual armed conflicts, and protections of members of the
armed forces of the United States and other states.
Despite manipulated rhetoric or claims to unbounded power, did the
laws of war apply to the September 11 th attacks? What is the legal status
under the laws of war of various types of persons detained or being prosecuted
by the United States? Perhaps more importantly for the United States and the
international community, is there a need to revise the laws of war in view of
bin Laden's use of terrorism and the various U.S. responses?
II. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT BE AT "WAR" WITH AL QAEDA OR
"TERRORISM"
Contrary to the assertion of President Bush, the United States simply
cannot be at war with bin Laden and al Qaeda as such, nor would it be in the
overall interest of the United States for the status of war to apply merely to
conflicts between the United States and al Qaeda. Bin Laden was never the
leader or member of a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group (as those
entities are understood in international law) that was at war with the United
States. Armed attacks by such non-state, non-nation, non-belligerent, non-
insurgent actors like bin Laden and members of al Qaeda can trigger the right
of selective and proportionate self-defense under the United Nations Charter
against those directly involved in an armed attack,5 but even the use of
military force by the United States merely against bin Laden and al Qaeda in
foreign territory would not create a state of war between the United States and
al Qaeda.
The lowest level of warfare or armed conflict to which certain laws of
war apply is an insurgency. For an insurgency to occur, the insurgent group
would have to have the semblance of a government, an organized military
force, control of significant portions of territory as its own, and its own
relatively stable population or base of support within a broader population. Al
Qaeda never met any of the criteria for insurgent status. Belligerent status
under the laws of war is based on the same criteria for insurgent status plus
outside recognition by one or more states either as a belligerent or a state.6 Al
4. See, e.g., Paust, Antiterrorism No. 1, supra note 1, at 7-8 n. 15.
5. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Use ofArmed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533 (2002).
6. Concerning criteria regarding an insurgency or belligerency, see, for example, The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666 (1862) (criteria include "when the party in rebellion occupy and hold
in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their
allegiance; have organized armies;") id. at 669; ("Foreign nations acknowledge it as a war by a
declaration of neutrality ... recognizing hostilities as existing."); see also U.S. Dep't of Army Field
Manual 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 9, para. I I(a) (1956) ("The customary law of war becomes
applicable to civil war upon recognition of the rebels as belligerents."); U.S. Dep't of Army, Pamphlet
27-161-2, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1962) ("If the rebellious side conducts its war by guerrilla tactics
it seldom achieves the status of a belligerent because it does not hold territory and it has no semblance of
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Qaeda never met the criteria for insurgent status and certainly lacked any
outside recognition as a belligerent, nation, or state. Indeed, al Qaeda is not
known to have even purported to be or to have the characteristics of a state,
nation, belligerent, or insurgent.
In view of the above, any conflict between the United States and al
Qaeda as such cannot amount to war or trigger application of the laws of war.7
Thus, outside the context of war to which the laws of war apply, members of
al Qaeda who were not otherwise attached to the armed forces of a belligerent
or state cannot be "combatants," much less "enemy" or so-called "unlawful"
combatants, or prisoners of war as those terms and phrases are widely known
in both international and U.S. constitutional law. In addition, "war" or "armed
conflict" and the laws of war could not have applied to the September 11 th
attacks by al Qaeda operatives, even though the attacks undoubtedly triggered
other international laws involving criminal responsibility and universal
jurisdiction, including crimes against humanity in connection with the
targeting of the World Trade Center.
With respect to the September 1 lth attacks as such, any attempt to
expand the concept of war beyond the present minimal levels of belligerency
and insurgency would be extremely dangerous because certain forms of non-
state actor violence and targetings that otherwise remain criminal could
become legitimate and create an extended, but unwanted, form of combatant
immunity. Two such targetings would have been the September 11 th attack on
the Pentagon, a legitimate military target during armed conflict or war (except
for the means used, an airliner with passengers and crew), and the previous
attack on the U.S.S. Cole, another legitimate military target during armed
conflict or war. Similarly, a radical extension of the status of war and the laws
of war to terroristic attacks by groups like al Qaeda (and there are or
predictably will be many such groups engaged in social violence) would
legitimize al Qaeda attacks on the President (as Commander-in-Chief) and
various U.S. "military personnel and facilities" in the United States and
abroad-attacks of special concern to President Bush, as noted in his
November 13th Military Order. Applying the status of war and the laws of
war to armed violence below the level of an insurgency can have the
unwanted consequence of legitimizing various other combatant acts and
immunizing them from prosecution. No leader of any country other than the
United States is known to have even suggested a need for such a radical
change in the status of war, the threshold levels concerning applicability of the
laws of war, and actual application of various laws of war (including an array
of competencies, rights, immunities, and obligations thereunder) to terrorist
targetings by groups like al Qaeda and selective and proportionate responsive
measures against such groups which do not involve the use of military force
a government."); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 809, 812-13, 815-16, 819,
831-32 (2d ed. 2000).
7. See also Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d
989, 1013-15 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the United States could not have been at war with the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which had engaged in terrorist acts as a non-state, non-
belligerent, non-insurgent actor). But see Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1 (2003).
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against the military of some other defacto or dejure state. It is not clear that
even President Bush contemplated the corrupting consequences of such an
extension of the status of war or the laws of war. Moreover, such
consequences would not be in the overall and long-term interests of either the
United States or the international community.
III. THE STATUS OF VARIOUS DETAINEES AND THE LEGAL TEST FOR
COMBATANT STATUS
Whether there is a need for revision of the laws of war that applied
during the armed conflict ofan international character in Afghanistan on and
after October 7th is a separate issue. With respect to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Protocols thereto, the caretaker of Geneva law, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), sees no need for revision
of Geneva law in view of the October 7th conflict. However, the ICRC does
openly express the need for greater compliance. In rare public statements, the
ICRC, like several European allies, has criticized the United States for its
initial refusal to recognize that the laws of war applied to the armed conflict
with the Taliban, for its mischaracterization of the status of Taliban military
detainees held in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, and for its refusal to
grant members of the armed forces of the Taliban prisoner of war status as
required under Geneva law.8 The ICRC also confirms that compliance with
Geneva law "in no manner constitutes an obstacle to the struggle against terror
and crime." 9 More generally, there is no significant need to revise the laws of
war, including Geneva law, because of the al Qaeda attacks on September
I Ith or the October 7th international armed conflict in Afghanistan. Some
have made sophistic, overly broad generalizations concerning the alleged
status of various types of persons detained by the United States after
September I I th, but there is no need to adopt radically new claims concerning
the status of various persons detained by the United States, such as those who
were (1) merely members of al Qaeda, (2) members of the armed forces of the
Taliban, or (3) U.S. citizens who were members of one or the other or both.
Extension of combatant or individual belligerent status to mere members of al
Qaeda-or denial of combatant or individual belligerent status to members of
the armed forces of the Taliban-would not merely be legally inappropriate,
but could also have seriously harmful consequences. In particular, this would
extend a radically new reach of combat immunity to mere members of al
Qaeda and a radically new denial of combat immunity to members of the
armed forces of various states. It should also be noted that during an armed
conflict, certain non-POWs who pose a real threat to security can be detained
without trial while they continue to pose such a threat and detention is
necessary, although they are entitled to judicial review of the propriety of their
8. See, e.g., Paust, Antiterrorism No. 1, supra note 1, at 7 n. 15.
9. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 479
(2002) (quoting ICRC Press Release on Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (Feb. 9, 2002) at
http://www.icrc.org.).
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detention. Furthermore, prisoners of war can be detained without trial for the
duration of the armed conflict.10 Additionally, any such person can be
prosecuted for an international crime that he or she is reasonably accused of
having committed.
The test for combatant or individual belligerent status under the laws of
war is straightforward. It is membership in the armed forces of a party to an
armed conflict of an international character. Thus, privileged or lawful
belligerents include members of the armed forces of a state, nation, or
belligerent during an armed conflict. As noted in U.S. military texts,
"[a]nyone engaging in hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to
the conflict" is a "combatant"' 1 and "[c]ombatants ... include all members of
the regularly organized armed forces of a party to the conflict."' 2 Article 1 of
the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention expressly states that belligerent
status will "apply ... to armies" and expressly sets forth additional criteria to
be met merely by "militia."' 13 The customary 1863 Lieber Code also affirmed:
"So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government, and takes the
soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other
warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses."' 5 Today, Article 4(A)(1)
of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War'
6
(GPW) has actually expanded the prisoner of war (POW) status which exists
for members of "armies" or "armed forces" to include such status for
members of certain militia forming part of the armed forces of a party to an
armed conflict.
Of course, members of the armed forces of the Taliban were not
simplistically mere "militia" or subject to the need to comply with additional
criteria for combatant status beyond the determinative criterion of
membership in an armed force or army of a state, nation, or belligerent.
Although some confuse the two, the tests for combatant status and prisoner of
war status can be different for certain types of combatants. For example, both
combatant status and prisoner of war status with respect to members of the
armed forces of a state, nation, or belligerent are based on a single
determinative criterion-membership in the armed forces.' 7 However,
10. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2003). The article also identifies relevant
human rights law concerning arbitrary detention, the human rights and Geneva law requirements of
judicial review of the propriety of detention, and trends in U.S. judicial decisions.
11. U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 12
(2002), https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETlnternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf.
12. U.S. NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS § 5.3 (1999).
13. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, Annex, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
15. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General
Orders No. 100 (Apr, 24, 1863) [hereinafter 1863 Liber Code], art. 57.
16. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 795 (S.D. Fla. 1992); George H.
Aldrich, Editorial Comment, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 891, 894-95 (2002); Paust, Antiterrorism No. 1, supra note 1, at 5-6 n.15; Steven R.
Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 905, 911 (2002).
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prisoner of war status for certain "militia" or members of "volunteer corps"
not attached to the armed forces of a party to an armed conflict hinges on
applicability of various additional criteria, as noted below concerning POW
status. With respect to an actual armed conflict (as opposed to the September
1 1th attacks as such), adding the word "enemy" to "combatant" has no legal
consequence. Enemies in a war who are combatants are indeed enemy
combatants.
IV. COMBAT IMMUNITY
Importantly, enemy combatants during an armed conflict of an
international character are privileged to engage in lawful acts of war such as
the targeting of military personnel and other legitimate military targets. Such
acts are privileged belligerent acts or acts entitled to combat immunity if they
are not otherwise violative of the laws of war or other international laws (e.g.,
those proscribing aircraft sabotage, aircraft hijacking, genocide, or other
crimes against humanity).' 8 Violations of the laws of war are war crimes;
violators are not entitled to immunity, and are thus prosecutable. However,
lawful acts of war are covered by the rule of combat immunity and cannot
properly be criminal under domestic law, nor can they be judged elements of
domestic crime or acts of an alleged conspiracy to violate domestic law. The
laws of war should not be changed to provide otherwise. As former General
and Professor Telford Taylor once wrote:
War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed in time of peace ....
Such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it takes place in the course of war, because the
state of war lays a blanket of immunity over the warriors. But the area of immunity is not
unlimited, and its boundaries are marked by the laws of war.19
Language in several cases is also informing. In United States v. Ohlendorf,2°
decided during the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings, a similar view was
recognized:
Many of the defendants seem to assume that by merely characterizing a person a partisan,
he may be shot out of hand. But it is not so simple as that. If the partisans are organized
and are engaged in what international law regards as legitimate warfare ...they are
entitled to be protected as combatants .... The language used in the official German
reports . . . show[s], however, that combatants were indiscriminately punished only for
having fought against the enemy. This is contrary to the law[s] of war."
18. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of
Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 683-85, n.35 (2002).
19. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 19-20 (1970).
For a more extensive list of authorities concerning combat immunity, see, e.g., Paust, supra note 18, at
683-84, n.35; Jordan J. Paust, The Right to Life in Human Rights Law and the Laws of War, 65 SASK. L.
REv. 463, 471-72 n.44 (2002).
20. 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NEURNBERG, MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 1 (1949).
21. Id. at 492-93. See also, United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NEURNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 757, 1236, 1246 (1948); see
also, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 47 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have no question here of
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If lawful combat actions could be the basis for domestic crimes, U.S. military
personnel would be placed in serious danger in any future armed conflict
involving U.S. military forces. The United States rightly expects as a matter of
venerable law that combat actions of U.S. armed forces that are not violative
of international law will be immune from prosecution under the domestic laws
of various countries in which they operate and that captured U.S. military
personnel will be treated as prisoners of war. There is no need to make
changes in the laws of war that will change such results or provide ready
pretexts for denial of combatant or prisoner of war status to U.S. or other
military personnel. Similarly, a decision to deny combat immunity to
members of the armed forces of the Taliban with respect to lawful acts of war
would be illegal and could have serious unwanted repercussions for U.S.
military personnel in the future.
Some who argue that members of the armed forces of the Taliban should
be denied either combatant or prisoner of war status stress partial language
from an old U.S. Supreme Court case, Ex parte Quirin, that was decided
before the creation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and much of the modern
law of warfare. In any event, Ex parte Quirin actually involved prosecution of
a set of combatants for war crimes, i.e., for one of the exceptions to combat
immunity for those combatants who engage in a violation of the laws of war.
Thus, Ex parte Quirin actually provides implied support for the principle of
combat immunity for lawful acts of combat. Defendants in that case were
clearly "enemy belligerents" or enemy combatants, but they were prosecutable
for war crimes2 1 "because [their particular acts were then] in violation of the
law of war,"24 and thus, the defendants were combatants,25 but had
nonetheless "violated the law of war applicable to enemies. ' '26 Thus, the war
crimes engaged in by particular individuals (as opposed to those engaged in
by other members of the armed forces of Germany) resulted in a lack of
combat immunity for those individuals with respect to their particular acts.
2 7
what the military might have done in a field of combat .... The purpose of battle is to kill."); United
States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("[T]he essential purpose of' GPW "is to
protect prisoners of war from prosecution for conduct which is customary in armed conflict."); United
States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 540 (1973); Arce v. State, 202 S.W. 951, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918)
(holding that four soldiers under command of the de facto government of Mexico who killed a U.S.
Army corporal during hostilities could not be lawfully prosecuted for such conduct); 1863 Lieber Code,
supra note 15, arts. 49, 56-57.
22. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
23. Id. at 36 ("Specification 1 of the First charge is sufficient to charge all the petitioners with
the offense of unlawful belligerency, trial of which is within the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the
admitted facts affirmatively show that the charge is not merely colorable or without foundation.")
(emphasis added).
24. Id. at 37. See also id. at 28 (noting jurisdiction of military tribunals to try "offenders or
offenses against the law of war").
25. Id. at 35 ("Our Government, by thus defining lawful belligerents entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war, has recognized that there is a class of unlawful belligerents not entitled to that
privilege, including those who though combatants do not wear 'fixed and distinctive emblems'. And by
Article 15 of the Articles of War Congress has made provision for their trial and punishment by military
commission, according to 'the law of war."') (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 44.
27. Id. at 36-7 ("As we have seen, entry upon our territory in time of war by enemy
belligerents, including those acting under the direction of the armed forces of the enemy, for the purpose
of destroying property used or useful in prosecuting the war, is a hostile and war-like act. It subjects
those who participate in it without uniform to the punishment prescribed by the law of war for unlawful
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However, this did not result in a lack of combatant status for those individuals
(or the rest of the German armed forces), a lack of combat immunity for
lawful acts of war, or a lack of access to federal courts concerning the
28propriety of their detention and prosecution. Ex parte Quirin also affirmed
that judicial power exists to finally determine the legal status of detainees
under and in accordance with international law: "From the very beginning of
its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including
that part of the law of nations which prescribes ... the status, rights and duties
of enemy . . . individuals." 29 Other federal courts have also addressed
international legal issues concerning prisoner of war status, the propriety of
detention, and provisional characterizations by the Executive during war.
Some use the regrettable and technically oxymoronic phrase "unlawful
combatant" in an inappropriate way that confuses separate issues regarding
personal status (e.g., as a combatant or noncombatant who is not privileged to
engage in warfare) and the lack of immunity for personal acts committed in
violation of the laws of war. If one is a combatant under the laws of war, one
is not an "unlawful combatant" and one does not become an "unlawful
combatant" merely because other members of the armed forces or unit to
which one belongs commit war crimes. More generally under the laws of war,
mere membership (even in a criminal organization) is not a crime and one
cannot become an "unlawful" combatant or lose POW status merely because
other members of the armed forces violate the laws of war. Additionally,
during war reprisals against any detainee and "collective punishment" (i.e.,
punishment of an individual not for what he or she has done but for the acts of
others) are war crimes. An attempt to deny combatant status to all members of
the armed forces of one's enemy because of the acts of some of its members
merely serves unlawful policies that form the foundation for such
prohibitions. Further, as expressed in common Article 1, Geneva law must be
applied "in all circumstances."
In view of the above, broad brush generalizations concerning all al
Qaeda or all Taliban are both intellectually and legally deficient. Lawful
combatant status, combat immunity, and POW status for members of the
armed forces of a party to an armed conflict rest either on the individual's
membership or personal conduct. Today under GPW, even a prisoner of war
being prosecuted for or who has been convicted of war crimes does not lose
POW status or protections. No changes in relevant laws of war are needed,
and some changes could have dire consequences for U.S. soldiers and afford
enemies of the United States a pretext for denial of present legal protections.
V. LEGAL TESTS FOR PRISONER OF WAR STATUS
With respect to prisoner of war status, the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War sets forth separate categories of persons
belligerents.") (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 24-25.
29. Id. at 27.
30. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 10.
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who are entitled to prisoner of war status during an armed conflict of an
international character. 31 The 1949 Convention's list of six separate categories
involved a clear change of certain prior interpretations of coverage under the
1929 Convention. Under express terms of the treaty, only one category out of
six contains criteria limiting prisoner of war status to those belonging to a
group that carries arms openly, wears a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance, and conducts operations generally in accordance with the law of war.
Under GPW Article 4(A)(2), these limiting criteria expressly apply only to
certain "militias or volunteer corps" or "organized resistance movements."
They expressly do not apply to "[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to
the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of
such armed forces" covered under 4(A)(1) or to "[m]embers of regular armed
forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized
by the Detaining Power" covered under 4(A)(3). 32
With respect to the armed forces of a party to the armed conflict in
Afghanistan (such as those of the Taliban and the United States), the
determinative criterion for prisoner of war status is membership. Thus,
members of the armed forces of each party qualify as prisoners of war under
GPW Article 4(A)(1), if not 4(A)(3), and the authoritative ICRC has expressly
recognized combatant and POW status for all members of the armed forces of
the Taliban. Moreover, POW status does not inhibit the ability to detain
enemy POWs for the duration of an armed conflict, whether or not particular
POWs can also be prosecuted for war crimes or other violations of
international law. Indeed, prisoners of war subject to prosecution do not
thereby lose their status as a prisoner of war. There is no need to change the
laws of war in that regard.
VI. DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES CAN ARISE IF THE LEGAL TESTS ARE
CHANGED.
A new extension of the four criteria expressly applicable only to one of
six categories addressed in GPW Article 4(A), i.e., those covered in 4(A)(2),
31. Insurgents during an armed conflict not of an international character to which merely
common Article 3 applies (and perhaps Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions and certain customary
laws of war) presently have no right to POW status or combat immunity. Curiously, the Bush pretense
of "war" against al Qaeda as such and "terrorism" might require such a status and immunity for those
who do not even have the status of insurgents under the laws of war. This would not be a preferable
result.
32. Article 4(A)(1) and (3) of the GPW states:
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of
the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: (1) Members of
the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer
corps forming part of such armed forces .... (3) Members of regular armed forces who
profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.
Expressum facit cessare tacitun. ("Something expressed nullifies what is unexpressed."). BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1635 (7th ed. 1999). Only 4(A)(2) contains the four limitations. Specialia generalibus
derogant. ("Special words derogate from general words. A special provision ... is to be preferred to
general language, which might have governed in the absence of such special provision."). BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1570 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). See, e.g., Paust, Antiterrorism No. 1, supra note 1, at 5-8 n.15.
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to the "armed forces" of a party to an armed conflict (who are presently
covered by Article 4(A)(1)) would result in a nonsensical, policy-thwarting
denial of POW status to all members of the armed forces of a party to an
armed conflict whenever several members do not wear a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance or several members violate the laws of war. Such an
approach is illogical and contrary to normal approaches to treaty
interpretation; it would seriously threaten POW status, combat immunity, and
protections for soldiers of various countries including U.S. military; and it
would be inconsistent with general state practice (which is also relevant for
treaty interpretation). In Afghanistan and more generally and in conformity
with widespread state practice, several types of U.S. soldiers (e.g., special
forces) and various regular soldiers at different times have used camouflage
and have otherwise attempted to blend in with local flora or geography in an
effort to avoid being recognizable at a distance, since they prefer not to be
clearly recognizable at all. Indeed, various U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan have
not only not met the criterion of wearing distinctive emblems or signs
recognizable at a distance, but have also been spotted wearing Afghan civilian
clothing and sporting beards to "blend in." 33
Thus, under the nonsensical approach, all U.S. soldiers could be denied
prisoner of war status during the conflict in Afghanistan and an upgraded war
with Iraq. Further, under the nonsensical approach, Lieutenant Calley's war
crimes at My Lai and those of other U.S. military personnel there and
elsewhere would have required a denial of POW status to any member of the
armed forces of the United States captured in Vietnam.34 Since it is not
unlikely, although regrettable, that during any armed conflict war crimes will
be committed by some soldiers on each side, the nonsensical approach thwarts
policies behind the prohibition of collective punishment and would provide a
pretext for enemies of the United States to deny POW status, combatant
status, and combat immunity to U.S. soldiers. There is no need to change the
laws of war to adopt such a nonsensical approach.
33. See, e.g., Henry J. Kenny, Mission: Free the Oppressed; U.S. Commandos Have Special
Skills-and Philosophy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 2002, § 2, at B3 (wearing "beards, riding donkeys into
combat"); Max Blenkin, SAS Troops Are the Mountain Phantoms - War on Terror, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Sept. 21 2002, at 10 ("They sport bushy beards like the locals."); see also, Ian
Bruce, US Soldiers Ordered To Lose Beards, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 16, 2002, at 11 (noting U.S.
Special Forces grew "beards and adopted local dress to allow them to blend in on undercover
missions"); James Brooke, Pentagon Tells Troops in Afghanistan: Shape Up and Dress Right, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2002, at B21 (noting that U.S. Special Forces "have been growing beards and donning
local garb in an effort to blend in with the local people and their surroundings"); Michael R. Gordon,
Securing Base, U.S. Makes Its Brawn Blend In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at BI("Dressed in Afghan
clothing and sporting scruffy beards, American soldiers here do their best to blend in when they move in
and out of the Afghan Capital, Kabul."); Glenn Mitchell, Bin Laden Bolts After Surrender, HERALD SUN
(Melbourne), Dec. 13, 2001, at 15 (reporting "a convoy of five trucks carried US troops wearing Afghan
dress").
34. See, e.g., Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Reason, various policies at stake, reciprocity, and established practice
stand in opposition to recent claims to change the law of war. Acceptance of
such claims would result in changing the status of war, modifying thresholds
for application of the laws of war, redefining "combatant" status, as well as
refusing to grant prisoner of war status to members of the armed forces of a
party to an international armed conflict. Were such changes to be made,
serious consequences could ensue for the United States, other countries, U.S.
military personnel, military personnel of other countries, and the rest of
humankind. In some ways, claimed changes in the laws of war could even
serve those who attacked the United States on September 11 th as well as other
non-state actors who might seek to engage in various forms of transnational
terrorism in the future. Mean-spirited denials of international legal protections
are not merely unlawful, but also disserve a free people. Such denials have no
legitimate claim to any role in our nation's responses to terrorism.

